JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. islators. Russia employed a mixed electoral system during the period of investigation, which allowed voters to cast two ballots, one for a party list in a PR contest and one for an individual candidate in a single member district. This system affords the opportunity to examine the impact of different electoral rules on minority representation while hold ing social conditions constant through the comparison of the PR and SMD tiers of mixed systems in a single country.8 This study also has the advantage of examining minority representation at the level of individual legislators rather than studying the electoral suc cess of ethnic parties. Data on individual legislators are essential to capture minority rep resentation through both ethnic and nonethnic parties. Finally, the Russian case is important because of the virtual absence of ethnic parties in this country. The lack of eth nic parties is a product of demography (most notably small ethnic groups) and actions by the Russian state, which has passed legislation that severely restricts the formation of eth nic or religious parties and campaigning on explicitly ethnic issues.9 Thus, this study examines the impact of electoral rules in a context where ethnic parties do not play a sig nificant role in electoral politics.
Electoral Systems and the Representation of Ethnic Minorities
Evidence from Russia It is often taken as a matter of faith that proportional representation (PR) increases minority representation while electoral systems with single member districts (SMD) exclude minorities from legislative representation. Lijphart argues that proportional rep resentation, for example, is not only better than single member districts but is superior to all other electoral institutions (for example, the alternative vote, reserved seats for minor ity groups, and mixed electoral systems) in promoting minority representation.5 While advocates of proportional representation acknowledge the possibility that minorities can gain representation under certain conditions in other electoral systems, it is still viewed as providing crucial advantages. As Lijphart explains, "the beauty of PR is that in addi tion to producing proportionality and minority representation, it treats all groups-eth nic, racial, religious, or even noncommunal groups-in a completely equal and evenhanded fashion. Why deviate from full PR at all?"6 Despite the scholarly consensus in favor of proportional representation, there is sur prisingly little empirical evidence that PR systems provide better representation of ethnic minorities than SMD systems. 7 This article offers a model of electoral system effects on minority representation and a set of hypotheses concerning how PR and SMD electoral rules will affect different categories of ethnic minorities under certain conditions.
Patterns of minority representation under PR and SMD electoral arrangements are then examined in Russia using a unique dataset that identifies the ethnicity of individual leg islators. Russia employed a mixed electoral system during the period of investigation, which allowed voters to cast two ballots, one for a party list in a PR contest and one for an individual candidate in a single member district. This system affords the opportunity to examine the impact of different electoral rules on minority representation while hold ing social conditions constant through the comparison of the PR and SMD tiers of mixed systems in a single country.8 This study also has the advantage of examining minority representation at the level of individual legislators rather than studying the electoral suc cess of ethnic parties. Data on individual legislators are essential to capture minority rep resentation through both ethnic and nonethnic parties. Finally, the Russian case is important because of the virtual absence of ethnic parties in this country. The lack of eth nic parties is a product of demography (most notably small ethnic groups) and actions by the Russian state, which has passed legislation that severely restricts the formation of eth nic or religious parties and campaigning on explicitly ethnic issues.9 Thus, this study examines the impact of electoral rules in a context where ethnic parties do not play a sig nificant role in electoral politics.
The findings presented here offer a challenge to the conventional wisdom that PR systems generally are more conducive to minority representation than SMD systems.
Instead, it is shown that, first, the effects of electoral systems are highly conditional on a number of demographic and institutional factors, second, more assimilated ethnic groups witness no significant differences in representation across electoral systems, and third, each type of system provides advantages over the other for certain types of ethnic minori ties, with neither PR nor SMD elections being advantageous more often than the other.
Consequently, various demographic and political factors, including group size, geo graphic concentration, ethnic federalism, and cultural assimilation, mitigate the influ ence of electoral systems on minority representation and thus must be taken into account when examining this relationship.
Electoral Systems and Minority Representation in National Legislatures
The ability of ethnic minorities to win legislative seats is usually seen as a consequence of electoral systems and the size and geographic concentration of minority populations.'0
The argument that PR systems foster the representation of ethnic minorities has typical ly rested on the idea that they encourage the emergence of ethnic parties. Essentially, proportional representation is expected to provide any ethnic minority, whether it is geographically concentrated or not, the ability to gain representation through an ethnic party and/or ethnic balancing on major parties' lists, whereas plurality systems are expected only to promote minority representation for ethnic groups that reach a critical mass within majority-minority electoral districts. From this perspective,
given that proportional representation is expected to promote minority representation under a greater number of circumstances than single member districts, its preferred sta tus remains intact even when acknowledging the prospect of minority representation under other systems.
A Model of Ethnic Representation
Clearly, studies of electoral system effects on ethnic representation tend to view the elec tion of ethnic minorities through the prism of ethnic voting -the tendency of ethnic groups to vote for coethnic candidates or parties when given the opportunity. However, to view minority representation as solely emanating from ethnic mobilization is too sim plistic, for members of ethnic minorities gain election through a variety of ways, often with considerable support from the majority population. In contrast, a model of ethnic Minority representation through ethnic mobilization requires that the winming candidate or party assemble an ethnic-based constituency capable of overcoming the electoral threshold for representation. The conventional wisdom presumes that the relative thresh old of PR systems tends to be much lower (depending on the district magnitude of the system) than that of plurality systems, in which the winner must capture a plurality of the vote, typically approaching 50 percent. This lower relative threshold lies at the heart of the greater proportionality between seats and votes under PR rules. However, plurality systems in countries with noninstitutionalized party systems such as Russia tend to have greater party fragmentation than countries with more institutionalized party systems, thus creating conditions usually associated with proportional representation.17 Moreover, it must be remembered that the absolute vote threshold for gaining a single seat in the legislature is actually lower in SMD systems, since it usually takes fewer votes to win in one district than to gain even a small percentage (for example, 5 percent) of the national vote. This caveat is important to keep in mind for very small ethnic groups with geo graphically concentrated populations. Under a PR system, such groups may be unable to field an ethnic party that could be viable and may be less attractive as candidates in a ticket-balancing strategy but may still constitute a winning electoral constituency within a single or handful of single member electoral districts.
The assimilation model assumes that members of an ethnic minority require mini mal or no support from coethnics in order to gain representation. This model represents the diametrically opposite set of outcomes compared to those seen through ethnic mobi lization because, unlike representation achieved through ethnic mobilization, the ethnic background of the candidate from assimilated minorities becomes a virtual nonfactor, allowing the minority candidate to win election with support from the majority popula tion. Under PR rules this outcome is characterized by the election of minority candidates among parties across the political spectrum rather than minority nominations concen trated in ethnic, multiethnic, or nonethnic parties that make some sort of appeal to attract minority voters. In SMD elections minority representation through assimilation is marked by election of minority candidates in electoral districts with high concentrations of voters from the majority ethnic group.
The two perspectives of ethnic mobilization and assimilation are presented as a con tinuum rather than a dichotomy because there are scenarios under which minority candi dates are elected that combine elements of minority and majority support. Parties may have incentives to nominate less assimilated minority candidates but not rely solely or even predominantly upon the support of those minorities for election. Particularly in PR systems, one can imagine that certain parties would nominate members of minority groups in order to attract support from particular ethnic groups as part of a larger elec toral constituency that also includes interests within the majority population.
Hypotheses
Based on this model, several hypotheses can be offered regarding the impact of electoral systems on minority representation conditioned by the size, geographic concentration, and relative assimilation of minority groups. In general, differences in the level of minor ity representation between PR and SMD tiers are driven by demographic characteristics that provide advantages for the group in one type of electoral system while at the same time producing disadvantages under the other system. Conversely, similar levels of rep resentation between the two tiers are produced either when demographic characteristics produce the same dynamic in both tiers (for example, assimilation) or when a combina tion of characteristics produce advantages in both tiers (for example, large and geo graphically concentrated groups).
Assimilation Hypothesis Highly assimilated ethnic minorities will experience no differ ence in the level of legislative representation between SMD and PR tiers, regardless of their size or geographic concentration.
Assimilation tends to diminish the impact of electoral systems on minority representa tion by lessening the perceived differences between the assimilated minority and the majority population. Highly assimilated ethnic minorities will be able to gamer support from the majority population to gain election, given that their ethnic identities are a less salient issue (and often a less perceptible voting cue) than the ethnicity of members of less assimilated groups. Consequently, like members of the majority ethnic group, mem bers of more assimilated minorities should be attractive candidates for PR party lists and SMD contests. There are other crucial distinctions in the patterns of representation of highly assimilated minority groups. In the SMD tier, members of these ethnic categories are expected to gain election in single member districts dominated by the majority pop ulation and to be nominated by major political parties (as opposed to running as inde pendents or members of minor parties). In the PR tier, highly assimilated minority candidates also are expected to have distinct partisan backgrounds, being nominated by more conservative and sometimes even nationalistic parties that tend not to nominate other minority groups.
Small, Concentrated Group Hypothesis Groups that are small, geographically concen trated, and less assimilated will achieve higher levels of legislative representation in the SMD tier than in the PR tier of mixed-member electoral systems.
Because they tend to be more displaced from the majority culture, less assimilated groups are likely to rely on ethnic mobilization to elect representatives to the national legislature. Small groups face disadvantages in PR elections because they are not large enough to sustain ethnic parties or to be nominated in large numbers on the party lists of major, nonethnic parties. However, if these small minorities are geographically concen trated, single member districts provide the best opportunity to gain election because they are most likely to constitute a majority in at least one single member electoral district.
Large, Dispersed Group Hypothesis Groups that are large, geographically dispersed, and less assimilated will achieve higher levels of legislative representation in the PR tier than in the SMD tier of mixed-member electoral systems.
Large, geographically dispersed ethnic groups that are less assimilated will gain greater representation in PR as opposed to SMD systems due to two countervailing dynamics.
One provides an advantage in proportional representation, while the other presents a dis advantage within single member districts. First, larger ethnic groups can marshal the sup port of a significant voting bloc on a national scale. This ability makes such groups potent electoral forces in PR systems because they can sustain a viable ethnic party and/or command a significant minority voting bloc that make them attractive candidates for multi-and nonethnic parties.
Large, Concentrated Group Hypothesis Groups that are relatively large, geographically concentrated, and less assimilated will experience no difference in the level of legislative representation between SMD and PR tiers.
Unlike assimilated minorities, which downplay the impact of electoral systems, certain ethnic groups have similar rates of PR and SMD representation because they combine demographic characteristics that provide advantages in each tier. Large, unassimilated ethnic minorities that are geographically concentrated enjoy two advantages over other minorities that enable them to achieve relatively high rates of representation under both PR and SMD electoral arrangements. In the PR tier, larger ethnic groups have the poten tial to mobilize larger voting blocs and thus should be better able to field viable ethnic parties or be more attractive candidates for mainstream political parties hoping to capture significant voting constituencies. In the SMD tier, these same large ethnic minorities should also possess an electoral advantage as long as they are geographically concentrat ed because such groups should have at their disposal a cohesive voting bloc capable of overcoming the electoral threshold in a (relatively) large number of single member dis tricts. By constituting a critical mass of the electorate nationally and within numerous single member districts, large, geographically concentrated ethnic groups should be able to find electoral success at roughly equivalent levels in both PR and SMD tiers.
Of course, these hypotheses are not particularly surprising. They match the general propositions of studies of electoral systems and minority representation, but with two important caveats. First, current scholarship does not highlight the potential for ethnic minorities to experience no difference in levels of representation under different types of electoral systems. Second, the conventional wisdom allows for SMD systems to produce levels of representation that would equal those expected under a PR system when ethnic groups are concentrated but does not argue that there are situations when SMD systems would actually produce levels of minority representation that would exceed those that would be produced in a PR system.
Data and Variables
Ethnicity is a socially constructed source of identity based on racial, religious, linguistic, cultural, or regional backgrounds. While often based on seemingly primordial properties such as skin color or language, most recent scholarship has emphasized the malleability of ethnic identity and its manipulability as a political force, particularly by the political elite.18 These aspects of ethnic identity have made it a difficult concept to examine sys tematically. Clearly, the phenomenon of ethnic mobilization is an important element in democratic politics, but capturing, much less measuring, its influence remains problem atic.
Scholarship on legislative representation of ethnic minorities faces even more fun damental data problems. While there are extensive and reliable databases on the number of women in legislatures around the world, no analogous source provides information regarding the ethnic identity of legislators. Thus, much is known about how electoral sys tems, cultural attitudes, and socioeconomic factors influence the election of women around the world, but very little is known about how these factors affect the election of ethnic minorities.19 This situation is hardly surprising given the sensitivity of such infor mation in many contexts.
As a result of this lack of information, theoretical propositions regarding the factors that influence minority representation tend not to be directly tested using empirical data or are examined through the use of questionable proxy measures such as the proportion of women elected to the legislature or the electoral success of ethnic parties.20 Such indi rect measures of the ethnic identity of legislators may fail to capture the full extent of minority representation, particularly in countries that do not have strong ethnic parties.
For the case examined here, information on the ethnic identity of individual legisla tors was available. The election of minority candidates, rather than the success of partic ular ethnic parties, was used as the dependent variable. The data come from official handbooks published by the Russian State Duma, presumably from information supplied by the deputies themselves or their staffs.
Ethnic Minorities in Russia
Russia is unique among postcommunist states in terms of its ethnic composition. It has a significant minority population-around 20 percent-similar in size to many countries of the region, such as Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia. However, unlike these states Russia lacks a single major minority group. Instead, the non-Russian population is com posed of literally dozens of very small groups. The largest minority group of the Russian Federation, Tatars, makes up less than four percent of the population, and only three groups (Tatars, Ukrainians, and Chuvash) comprise over one percent of the country's population. The composition of Russia's ethnic population can not be properly understood without acknowledgment of its institutionalization within a system of ethnic federalism. The Russian Federation has continued the Soviet practice of defining some of its federal units along ethnic lines. Russia is composed of eighty-nine subjects or regions that are divided into twenty-one republics, forty nine oblasts, six krais, two cities (Moscow and St. Petersburg), ten autonomous okrugs, and one autonomous oblast (the Jewish
Autonomous Oblast). Republics, autonomous okrugs, and the Jewish Autonomous
Oblast make up the thirty two regions named after a non-Russian ethnic group. As Harris has demonstrated, Russia's ethnic federalism has had a strong influence on the ethnic identity of non-Russians. Groups provided with "ethnic homelands" man aged to retain their native languages and resist assimilation efforts to a much greater extent than (often larger) minority groups that lacked their own designated federal region.22 Moreover, regional governments in ethnic homelands have cultivated ethnic mobilization in center-periphery relations. The very designation of ethnic federal units has produced incentives and resources for the promotion of an ethnic cadre of elites and mass mobilization tied to ethnicity.23 Thus, ethnic federalism has indirectly affected minority representation through its influence over ethnic identity and behavior itself, cre ating, in most cases, less assimilated and more geographically concentrated ethnic groups that have certain political opportunities and resources that other groups without their own ethnic homelands lack. The confluence of certain levels of cultural assimilation and geographic concentra tion with federal or nonfederal status within Russia's ethnic federal system has produced two discernible categories of ethnic minorities within Russia. The first category, nonfed eral minorities, includes groups that do not have their own ethnic homeland within the Russian federal system. Consequently, these groups tend to be more geographically dis persed and more culturally assimilated than those groups with an ethnic homeland. This category is quite ethnically diverse with groups with a Slavic background (Ukrainians and Belorussians), as well as groups with origins from Europe (Germans, Greeks, and Finns), Eurasia (Latvians, Georgians, and Armenians), and Asia (Koreans).
The second category, federal minorities, is made up of groups that have their own fed eral subunit. These groups tend to be more geographically concentrated than other minorities -on average, 66 percent of titular nationalities live in their designated feder al units-and are relatively unassimilated into the majority Russian culture.24 Table 1 shows the federal designation, relative assimilation (measured as percentage claiming Russian as their first language), and level of geographic concentration of select minority groups in Russia.25
By and large, the figures in Table 1 
Minority Representation in Russia
Given the ethnic make-up of Russia, one might expect both the PR and plurality tiers of its mixed electoral system to underrepresent non-Russian ethnic groups, based on the assumption that minority representation is primarily driven by the mobilization of coeth overrepresented the majority ethnic group, despite the advantages Russians possessed under both systems. Russians were elected to the legislature in almost identical numbers in both tiers and in nearly equal proportion to their population. However, there were important differences in the overall representation of federal and nonfederal ethnic minorities and the impact of electoral rules on these two categories. Table 2 Second, the data in Table 2 strongly suggest that the key to nonfederal minorities' electoral success was support from the majority Russian population. Unlike less assimi lated federal minorities, nonfederal minorities gained election in political contexts dom inated by Russians. As Table 2 vividly shows, there were dramatic differences in the types of single member districts that elected nonfederal and federal minorities. The more assimilated nonfederal minorities won the vast majority of their seats in regions where
Russians were in the majority, whereas the less assimilated federal minorities won virtu ally all of their SMD seats in non-Russian ethnic homelands.
Jews pose the one exception to the two patterns discussed above because, although they have their own ethnic homeland, Jewish candidates gained representation in con texts associated with the election of nonfederal groups. As shown in Table 2 , unlike other federal minorities Jews tended to be overrepresented in the State Duma (given their small numbers), and Jewish candidates gained almost all of their seats in the PR tier and SMD contests in Russian regions. However, this exception actually bolsters the argument. As discussed above, the demographic and cultural profile of Russian Jews is much more similar to nonfederal minorities than to federal ones. Jews tend to be geographically dis persed and highly urbanized and are perhaps the most linguistically assimilated minority in Russia (see Table 1 ). Thus, in gaining election through venues dominated by the majority population, the experience of this group has simply followed general patterns of Russia's mixed electoral system suggest that these other factors can not account for the differences observed in the modes of representation for federal and nonfederal minorities in Russia.
Deputies from nonfederal and federal minorities did have distinct patterns of parti san affiliation.30 However, these distinctions are better conceived of as effects rather than intervening causes of the way that ethnicity has intersected with electoral politics in deputies coming from the "other" group, which included members of professions and occupations such as artists, academics, and low-level bureaucrats that tended to be less prevalent in the national legislature. The key distinction lay in residence in Russian ver sus non-Russian regions. Members of nonfederal and federal ethnic groups were virtual mirror images of one another in terms of patterns of regional (outside of Moscow) resi dency patterns. Thus, minority deputies tended to be local rather than national politicians who resided among their constituents. Nonfederal minority deputies' constituents simply lived in Russian-majority regions, while federal minority deputies' constituents lived in ethnic homelands.
In short, analyses of levels of partisanship and social background suggest that other factors related to partisanship and social status provide much less explanatory power for the distinct patterns of election of different minority groups than the influence of ethnic ity itself and, in particular, the impact of cultural assimilation for one subset of ethnic minority groups and geographic concentration for the other.
Secondary Electoral Rules, Proportional Representation, and Federal Minorities
While federal minorities tended to gain more representation in SMD elections, the dif ference in the level of representation between the two tiers dropped significantly after the initial postcommunist election in 1993. This change over time was driven by the fact that the number of PR deputies among federal minorities doubled after the initial election in 1993 (see Table 2 ).
This increase of representation for geographically concentrated minorities in the PR tier is most likely due to an institutional factor: a change in the electoral law instituted after the initial postcommunist election. Beginning with the 1995 election, parties were required to draw up a national list of twelve (later eighteen) candidates, followed by regional sublists established by parties themselves.31 If a party won enough seats to go beyond the national list, the remaining seats were distributed according to the relative proportion of votes won in each region outlined by the party. Regions with the greatest number of votes for a given party were the first to receive parliamentary seats. This change may have provided more opportunities for candidates from geographically con centrated ethnic groups with their own federal units to obtain a winning position on major party lists if support for such parties was more concentrated in non-Russian regions than other parts of the country.
Conclusions
The contours of minority representation in Russia have several important implications for the study of the effects of electoral systems on ethnic representation. First, contrary to conventional wisdom, proportional representation did not display any greater propen sity to elect minorities to the national legislature than plurality elections. In every elec tion the SMD tier produced more minority representatives than the PR tier.
Second, the Russian experience suggests that there is a complex interaction among assimilation, geographic concentration, and institutions. Minority groups appeared to gain representation at varying levels under PR and SMD rules and in different demo graphic contexts depending largely on how well assimilated they were with the majority Russian population. Thus, more assimilated, geographically dispersed minorities gained substantial representation (well beyond what could be expected based on their share of the population) in both the PR and SMD tiers of Russia's mixed system. Given the absence of a critical mass of coethnics, one must assume this electoral success was attained through support from the Russian majority. The reason that proportional repre sentation did not favor the election of these groups was their ability to gain election in a substantial number of Russian-majority single member districts. While many geograph ically dispersed groups (Jews, Armenians, Germans), followed this pattern, the striking success of the most assimilated Slavic minorities suggests that assimilation is a key fac tor that needs to be taken into consideration when ascertaining the causes of minority representation. Conversely, less assimilated, geographically concentrated minorities appearedto gain election much more through the mobilization of coethnics. Thus, these groups gained most of their representation in the SMD tier, predominantly in districts within federally designat ed ethnic homelands. The reason that the electoral advantages within the SMD tier declined after 1993 was a change in the electoral law. When Russia changed its PR sys tem to include regional sublists in each party list, geographically concentrated ethnic minorities benefited because they represented regional voting blocs and had their own federal entities.
Finally, electoral laws are not the only institutional instruments affecting the elec toral mobilization of minorities. In the Russian case, ethnic federalism was the most important institutional factor influencing ethnic representation. The establishment of federal subunits designated as ethnic homelands for certain minorities substantially influenced all other factors that played a role in minority representation. Those groups with their own federal region tended to be less assimilated and more geographically con centrated than their nonfederalized counterparts.
These findings suggest the need for caution when considering the impact of electoral systems in ethnically diverse societies. Proportional representation may not provide ethnic minorities with the avenue to legislative representation its proponents claim, especially in countries that do not have strong ethnically based parties. While the introduction of proportional representation may increase the likelihood that ethnic par ties will emerge, it provides no guarantee. Other electoral rules governing party forma tion and registration will affect this outcome, as will the existence or nonexistence of ethnic groups that are large and cohesive enough to sustain such parties. 32 In Russia, the absence of ethnic parties can be traced to both demographic factors (small minority groups) and actions by the state that legally curtailed party elites from forming ethnic parties and campaigning on ethnic themes. In a more permissible legal environment, eth nic parties (for example, a Muslim party) may attain greater influence and thus change the interrelationship between electoral rules and particular ethnic minorities.33
Finally, electoral systems do not affect all minorities in the same way. More assimi lated minorities that can attract substantial electoral support from the majority population may not need special institutional mechanisms such as majority-minority single member districts to attain legislative representation, while such institutional devices may be the only way for less assimilated minorities to achieve representation.
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